Relaxing the substitutes condition in matching markets with contracts

被引：3
作者：
Flanagan, Francis X. [1 ]
机构：
[1] Wake Forest Univ, Winston Salem, NC 27109 USA
来源：
ECONOMICS LETTERS | 2014年 / 123卷 / 02期
关键词：
Matching; Stability; Consistent substitutes; STABILITY;
D O I：
10.1016/j.econlet.2014.01.040
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
In the many-to-one matching model with contracts, I provide new necessary and new sufficient conditions for the existence of a stable allocation. These new conditions exploit the fact that one side of the market has strict preferences over individual contracts. (C) 2014 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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页码：113 / 117
页数：5
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