Merging, reputation, and repeated games with incomplete information

被引：29
作者：
Sorin, S
机构：
[1] Ecole Polytech, Lab Eonometrie, F-75005 Paris, France
[2] Univ Paris 10, MODALX, F-92001 Nanterre, France
[3] Univ Paris 10, THEMA, UFR SEGMI, F-92001 Nanterre, France
来源：
GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR | 1999年 / 29卷 / 1-2期
关键词：
D O I：
10.1006/game.1999.0722
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
We relate and unify several results that appeared in the following domains: merging of probabilities, perturbed games and reputation phenomena, and repeated games with incomplete information. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72. D83. (C) 1999 Academic Press.
引用
收藏
页码：274 / 308
页数：35
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