Imperfect market, emissions trading scheme, and technology adoption: A case study of an energy-intensive sector

被引:27
作者
Wang, Xu [1 ]
Zhang, Xiao-Bing [2 ]
Zhu, Lei [3 ]
机构
[1] China Univ Min & Technol, Sch Management, Xuzhou 221116, Jiangsu, Peoples R China
[2] Renmin Univ China, Sch Appl Econ, Beijing 1008726, Peoples R China
[3] Beihang Univ, Sch Econ & Management, Beijing 100191, Peoples R China
基金
中国国家自然科学基金;
关键词
Imperfect market; Emissions trading scheme; Technological diffusion; Production capacity; Strategic behaviour; ENVIRONMENTAL-POLICY INSTRUMENTS; POLLUTION PERMITS; DIFFUSION; STANDARDS; INVESTMENT; STRATEGIES; REDUCTION; BEHAVIOR; COSTS; POWER;
D O I
10.1016/j.eneco.2019.03.014
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
It is widely accepted that the firms included in an emissions trading scheme (ETS) come mostly from oligopolistic industries. The "exclusionary manipulation" of these heterogeneous emitters can distort both output and permit markets and lead to differences in abatement technology adoption. We studied the impacts of asymmetric firms' market power on the diffusion of abatement technologies. A model for technology adoption among heterogeneous firms has been established, which takes into account diversity in production capacity and the integration of firms' strategic behaviour in both the carbon permit and the output markets. Our model reveals that, considering the direct and strategic effects in adoption benefits, firms' production capacity can directly determine their sequence order of adoption, and their market power can accelerate the diffusion of a new abatement technology. A case study of an energy-intensive sector in China is illustrated to support the conclusions derived from the model and help policymakers better understand the diffusion of abatement technologies under imperfect market structure. (C) 2019 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:142 / 158
页数:17
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