Form versus Substance: The Implications for Auditing Practice and Research of Alternative Perspectives on Corporate Governance

被引:168
作者
Cohen, Jeffrey R. [1 ]
Krishnamoorthy, Ganesh [2 ]
Wright, Arnold M. [2 ]
机构
[1] Boston Coll, Chestnut Hill, MA 02167 USA
[2] Northeastern Univ, Boston, MA USA
来源
AUDITING-A JOURNAL OF PRACTICE & THEORY | 2008年 / 27卷 / 02期
关键词
corporate governance; resource dependence; managerial hegemony; institutional theory; agency theory;
D O I
10.2308/aud.2008.27.2.181
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
The objective of this paper is to provide a more comprehensive view of corporate governance than that considered by the traditional agency literature predominately employed in auditing and accounting studies of governance. Specifically, we discuss three widely recognized additional theoretical perspectives: resource dependence, managerial hegemony, and institutional theory. Resource dependence is developed in the strategic management literature and focuses on the contribution of governance mechanisms as a vehicle to help a firm achieve or further its strategic objectives. In contrast with the agency and resource dependence perspectives which offer a functional view of governance, the managerial hegemony perspective views the board and its attendant committees as being under the control of management and hence could be potentially viewed as dysfunctional from a stakeholder viewpoint. Finally, institutional theory, developed in the sociology of organizations and organizational behavior literatures, suggests that it is necessary to understand the substance of the interactions between different governance parties and how these parties use at times symbolic gestures and activities to maintain their form to all relevant parties. Although the value of using multiple theoretical perspectives with respect to governance has been well recognized in the economics and behavioral literatures, this is the first paper that we are aware of that examines the effect of using alternative theories of governance on auditing issues that are influenced by the governance structure of a firm. In addition, we examine how these theories provide a useful basis for reconciling conflicting findings in the existing agency-based audit-related governance literature. Finally, we provide examples of how these alternative theories provide important new insights to issues in auditing research and practice.
引用
收藏
页码:181 / 198
页数:18
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