Stable lexicographic rules for shortest path games

被引：10

作者：

Bahel, Eric ^{[1
]}

Trudeau, Christian ^{[2
]}

机构：

[1] Virginia Polytech Inst & State Univ, Dept Econ, Blacksburg, VA 24061 USA

[2] Univ Windsor, Dept Econ, Windsor, ON N9B 3P4, Canada

来源：

ECONOMICS LETTERS | 2014年 / 125卷 / 02期

关键词：

Shortest path; Core; Algorithm; Lexicographic minima;

D O I：

10.1016/j.econlet.2014.08.033

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

For the class of shortest path games, we propose a family of new cost sharing rules satisfying core selection. These rules allocate shares according to some lexicographic preference relation. A computational procedure is provided. Our results relate to those of Tijs et al. (2011). (C) 2014 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：266 / 269

页数：4

共 4 条

[1] A discrete cost sharing model with technological cooperation
Bahel, Eric
Trudeau, Christian
[J]. INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF GAME THEORY, 2013, 42 (02) : 439 - 460
[2] Dijkstra E. W., 1959, NUMER MATH, V1, P269
[3] Shortest path games
Rosenthal, Edward C.
[J]. EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF OPERATIONAL RESEARCH, 2013, 224 (01) : 132 - 140
[4] An average lexicographic value for cooperative games
Tijs, Stef
Borm, Peter
Lohmann, Edwin
Quant, Marieke
[J]. EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF OPERATIONAL RESEARCH, 2011, 213 (01) : 210 - 220

← 1 →