The Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) was created in 1959 as an institution linked to Latin American development. Due to its orientation, from the beginning it was considered necessary for the countries of the region to be close to the Bank's decision making process, in order to ensure a connection between the Bank's guidelines and the needs of Latin American countries. Within this framework, an unwritten pact was established, which stated that the Bank's presidency should be held by a Latin American country. This agreement, which lasted 61 years, came to an end in the 2020 elections, when the United States nomina-ted its own candidate, who would later be the winner. The U.S. action generated different reactions in the region, both in support and rejection. This research aims to analyze how the U.S. presidency of the IDB represents a strategy to undermine China's advance in Latin America. Through the theoretical approach of offensive realism, the different U.S. actions and their main objectives in the IDB presidency are analyzed. The paper concludes that the U.S. pursuit of the IDB presidency represents a strategy to reduce China's financial influence in the region. The IDB's technical and normative capabilities enable it to strengthen U.S. hegemony in Latin America and challenge Chinese interference.
