Behavioral dynamics of tax evasion - A survey

被引:100
作者
Pickhardt, Michael [1 ]
Prinz, Aloys [2 ]
机构
[1] Brandenburg Tech Univ Cottbus, Fac 3, Inst Econ, D-03013 Cottbus, Germany
[2] Univ Munster, Inst Publ Econ, D-48143 Munster, Germany
关键词
Tax evasion; Theoretical models; Psychological and economic experiments; Agent-based models; AGENT-BASED MODEL; MEASURING SOCIAL PREFERENCES; SLIPPERY SLOPE FRAMEWORK; INCOME-TAX; PROSPECT-THEORY; LABORATORY EXPERIMENTS; COMPLIANCE DECISIONS; INDIVIDUAL BEHAVIOR; COMMUNITY STRUCTURE; MORALE;
D O I
10.1016/j.joep.2013.08.006
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
Since the 1950s (Schmolders, 1959) it is well known that behavioral aspects have an influence on tax evasion or tax compliance. In particular, interactions among the various entities involved in the taxation process (e.g. taxpayers, law makers, tax practitioners, tax authorities, etc.), and the dynamics that these interactions may generate, seem to play an important role for the actual level of tax compliance. However, the mainstream neoclassical approach to tax evasion (Allingham & Sandmo, 1972) cannot account for such interactions and dynamics. Therefore, during the last two decades new approaches (e.g. lab experiments, agent-based modeling, etc.) have been developed with a view to model how behavioral dynamics may foster or prevent tax evasion. In addition, empirical evidence has been generated that supports a role for such interaction dynamics. In this contribution we survey the main developments in this research area and provide some suggestions for further research. (C) 2013 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:1 / 19
页数:19
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