Research on Adverse Selection of Automobile Insurance Market

被引：0

作者：

Hong, Hao-lin ^{[1
]}

Jiang, Ye ^{[2
]}

Zhou, Qian ^{[3
]}

机构：

[1] Guangdong Elect Power Dev CO LT, Room 2506 South Tower Yuedian Sq,2 Tianhe East Rd, Guangzhou, Guangdong, Peoples R China

[2] North China Elect Power Univ Baoding, Baoding City, Herts, Peoples R China

[3] Tongji Univ, Shanghai, Peoples R China

来源：

INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON COMPUTER, NETWORK SECURITY AND COMMUNICATION ENGINEERING (CNSCE 2014) | 2014年

关键词：

Automobile insurance market; Information asymmetry; Signal transmission model; Separating equilibrium; INFORMATION;

D O I：

暂无

中图分类号：

TP3 [计算技术、计算机技术];

学科分类号：

0812 ;

摘要：

The number of cars which are bought by the individuals begins to increase in China, and the business of car insurance is growing fast in recent years. Due to the information asymmetry between auto insurance companies and car owners in the car insurance market, the adverse selection influences auto insurance companies' profit. This article establishes a standard signal transmission model, where the group who has private information decides the later process of this matter, and analyzes the insurance premium and compensation level the insurance companies offer according to the different risk preferences of car owners in order to reach an equilibrium to maximize the utility of both groups.

引用

页码：587 / 590

页数：4

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