Explaining executive compensation: Managerial power versus the perceived cost of stock options

被引：153

作者：

Murphy, KJ ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Univ So Calif, Marshall Sch Business, Los Angeles, CA 90089 USA

[2] Univ So Calif, Sch Law, Los Angeles, CA 90089 USA

来源：

关键词：

D O I：

10.2307/1600633

中图分类号：

D9 [法律]; DF [法律];

学科分类号：

0301 ;

摘要：

引用

页码：847 / 869

页数：23

共 29 条

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