Fast Private Set Intersection from Homomorphic Encryption

被引:196
作者
Chen, Hao [1 ]
Laine, Kim [1 ]
Rindal, Peter [1 ]
机构
[1] Microsoft Res, Redmond, WA 98052 USA
来源
CCS'17: PROCEEDINGS OF THE 2017 ACM SIGSAC CONFERENCE ON COMPUTER AND COMMUNICATIONS SECURITY | 2017年
关键词
private set intersection; fully homomorphic encryption;
D O I
10.1145/3133956.3134061
中图分类号
TP [自动化技术、计算机技术];
学科分类号
0812 ;
摘要
Private Set Intersection (PSI) is a cryptographic technique that allows two parties to compute the intersection of their sets without revealing anything except the intersection. We use fully homomorphic encryption to construct a fast PSI protocol with a small communication overhead that works particularly well when one of the two sets is much smaller than the other, and is secure against semi-honest adversaries. The most computationally efficient PSI protocols have been constructed using tools such as hash functions and oblivious transfer, but a potential limitation with these approaches is the communication complexity, which scales linearly with the size of the larger set. This is of particular concern when performing PSI between a constrained device (cellphone) holding a small set, and a large service provider (e.g. WhatsApp), such as in the Private Contact Discovery application. Our protocol has communication complexity linear in the size of the smaller set, and logarithmic in the larger set. More precisely, if the set sizes are N-y < N-x, we achieve a communication overhead of O(N-y, log N-x). Our running-time-optimized benchmarks show that it takes 36 seconds of online-computation, 71 seconds of non-interactive (receiver-independent) pre-processing, and only 12.5MB of round trip communication to intersect five thousand 32-bit strings with 16 million 32-bit strings. Compared to prior works, this is roughly a 38-115x reduction in communication with minimal difference in computational overhead.
引用
收藏
页码:1243 / 1255
页数:13
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