Innovative Design of "Win-Win" Model of Supply Chain Finance Based on Bank-Enterprise Dynamic Game

被引：0

作者：

Li Shihua ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Wuhan Text Univ, Wuhan 430077, Peoples R China

来源：

PROCEEDINGS OF THE 13TH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON INNOVATION AND MANAGEMENT, VOLS I & II | 2016年

关键词：

Supply chain finance; Bayesian Nash equilibrium; Dynamic game; Win-Win;

D O I：

暂无

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

The bank-enterprise credit relationship in supply chain finance is a process of dynamic game. Platform of supply chain financing is the optimal contract design and path selection to achieve "win-win" of bank-enterprise. In this paper, we're trying to establish a dynamic game model to analyze the decisions of bank-enterprise, analyze the Bayesian Nash equilibrium and its existing conditions to find out their respective optimal choice, and design the supply chain financing platforms actively. The purpose is to meet the different financing needs of small and medium-sized enterprises in supply chain, achieve the "win-win" target of supply chain finance.

引用

页码：919 / 922

页数：4