Consider a seller who can make an observable but non-contractible investment to improve an intermediate good that is specialized to a particular buyer's needs. The buyer then makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the seller. The seller has private information about the fraction of the ex post surplus that he can realize on his own. Compared to a situation with complete information, additional investment incentives are generated by the seller's desire to pretend a strong outside option. On the other hand, ex post efficiency is not attained since asymmetric information at the bargaining stage sometimes leads to inefficient separations. (C) 2014 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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Univ N Carolina, Kenan Flagler Business Sch, McColl Bldg, Chapel Hill, NC 27599 USAUniv N Carolina, Kenan Flagler Business Sch, McColl Bldg, Chapel Hill, NC 27599 USA
Reuer, Jeffrey J.
Tong, Tony W.
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SUNY Buffalo, Jacobs Management Ctr, Sch Management, Buffalo, NY 14260 USAUniv N Carolina, Kenan Flagler Business Sch, McColl Bldg, Chapel Hill, NC 27599 USA