State attempts to ensure a secure liberal democratic order through legal regulation and enforcement may work to prevent harm, provide public resources, or realize civic and human rights. Such attempts may also increase generalized risk of harm, reinscribe social inequality, circumscribe citizenship or instigate mass protest. These contradictory forces and relations, and their conditions of possibility-what we may call broadly the "politics of democratic security and order"-tend to be analyzed through the lens of government impositions on, and opposition to, the general public, for example focusing on how anti-terrorism legislation violates peoples' civil liberties. This article addresses the politics of democratic security and order from a different and under-theorized angle that troubles the assumed opposition between a powerful state apparatus and subjugated citizens' rights: namely, special restrictions placed on the rights of security enforcement agents themselves. Through ethnographic and archival research in India on attempts to form police unions-which are legally banned by a parliamentary act, yet politically active in many states of the country routinely touted as "the world's largest democracy"-I demonstrate how conflicts related to these organizations may create new possibilities for mass politics, state-society alignments, and legal advocacy for civic and human rights, even as extant laws, regulations and, perhaps most importantly, public discourses around security and police discipline place extraordinary constraints on the political subjectivity of state security actors.
