The problem of trust in representatives is one of the most difficult problems faced by representative democracies. It is especially acute when technically and politically complex bills are considered, or a large number of interest groups are in play and/or issues that require specific knowledge are discussed. In such situations, citizens are not particularly inclined to participate in collective decision-making and try to delegate the study of all aspects of an issue to parties, non-profit organizations and other representative agents, but at the same time they have less confidence in these agents, as well as in the legislative bodies. The article attempts to show that the solution to the problem of trust in representatives should be sought in the field of theories of federalism. In particular, the author refers to the concept of federalism elaborated by Jean-Jacques Rousseau in the "Considerations on the Government of Poland". His analysis demonstrates that Rousseau, who is considered to be an uncompromising critic of representative democracy, in principle admits the compatibility of popular government with political representation if there is a third element - federalism. According to Rousseau, popular government can exist only in a situation where citizens themselves are the authors of laws that they obey, which is possible under political representation, but only if the authorities of the people's representatives are given by the orders of the voters and the people's representatives are willing to follow these orders. Federalism provides both. According to the author, the model of the federal structure described in the "Considerations on the Government in Poland" provides mechanisms to ensure reconciliation of the interests of representatives and represented, as well as the competence of representatives, and creates conditions for establishing trust between representatives and represented.