Managerial optimism and corporate finance

被引:522
作者
Heaton, JB [1 ]
机构
[1] Bartlit Beck Herman Palenchar & Scott, Chicago, IL USA
[2] Duke Univ, Durham, NC 27706 USA
关键词
D O I
10.2307/3666221
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
Two dominant features emerge from a simple model of corporate finance with excessively optimistic managers and efficient capital markets. First, optimistic managers believe that capital markets undervalue their firm risky securities, and may decline positive net present value projects that must be financed externally. Second, optimistic managers overvalue their own corporate projects and may wish to invest in negative net present value projects even when they are loyal to shareholders. These results establish an underinvestment-overinvestment trade off related to free cash flow without invoking asymmetric information or rational agency costs.
引用
收藏
页码:33 / 45
页数:13
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