THE CAUSAL CLOSURE PRINCIPLE

被引：15

作者：

Gibb, Sophie ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Durham, Dept Philosophy, Durham DH1 3HP, England

来源：

PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY | 2015年 / 65卷 / 261期

关键词：

causal closure principle; interactive dualism; powers theory of causation; causal sufficiency; double prevention; enabling events; COMPLETENESS;

D O I：

10.1093/pq/pqv030

中图分类号：

B [哲学、宗教];

学科分类号：

01 ; 0101 ;

摘要：

In the mental causation debate, there is a common assumption that interactive dualism is false because of the principle of the causal closure of the physical domain. However, this paper argues that recent advances in metaphysics-more specifically, in the philosophy of causation-reveal a serious, general flaw in contemporary formulations of this principle.

引用

页码：626 / 647

页数：22

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