THE PERCEPTUAL PRESENT

被引：3

作者：

Connor, Abigail ^{[1
]}

Smith, Joel ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Manchester, Manchester, Lancs, England

来源：

PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY | 2019年 / 69卷 / 277期

基金：

英国艺术与人文研究理事会;

关键词：

Perception; temporal consciousness; the present; indexicals;

D O I：

10.1093/pq/pqz017

中图分类号：

B [哲学、宗教];

学科分类号：

01 ; 0101 ;

摘要：

Phenomenologically speaking, we perceive the present, recall the past, and anticipate the future. We offer an account of the temporal content of the perceptual present that distinguishes it from the recalled past and the anticipated future. We distinguish two views: the Token-Reflexive Account and the Minimal Account. We offer reasons to reject the Token-Reflexive Account, and defend the Minimal Account, according to which the temporal content of the perceptual present is exhausted by its direct reference to the interval of time over which it occurs.

引用

页码：817 / 837

页数：21

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