共 12 条
How do political connections cause SOEs and non-SOEs to make different M&A decisions/performance? Evidence from China
被引:55
|作者:
Liu, Qigui
[1
]
Luo, Tianpei
[2
]
Tian, Gary Gang
[3
]
机构:
[1] Zhejiang Univ, Sch Management, Hangzhou, Peoples R China
[2] Curtin Univ, Dept Finance & Banking, Perth, WA, Australia
[3] Macquarie Univ, Dept Appl Finance & Actuarial Studies, Sydney, NSW, Australia
基金:
中国国家自然科学基金;
关键词:
Anti‐
corruption;
Mergers and acquisitions;
Ownership structure;
Political connections;
Property right law;
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE;
PERFORMANCE EVIDENCE;
FIRM PERFORMANCE;
STATE OWNERSHIP;
MERGER ACTIVITY;
RETURNS;
MARKET;
INSTITUTIONS;
TAKEOVERS;
PAYMENT;
D O I:
10.1111/acfi.12302
中图分类号:
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号:
0202 ;
摘要:
This study examines the impact that political connections have on Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A) performance and the decisions of Chinese listed firms. We find that political connections destroy (create) value in SOEs (non-SOEs). Our findings show that connected SOEs are more likely to acquire local targets, especially when the local unemployment rate is high and when the firms are controlled by the local government, and they are less likely to conduct vertical mergers. M&A decisions of connected non-SOEs are less influenced by the government; instead, political connections in non-SOEs help bidders to integrate vertically and obtain external financing support.
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页码:2579 / 2619
页数:41
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