Effects of synergy and discounting on cooperation in spatial public goods games

被引:10
作者
Quan, Ji [1 ]
Zhang, Man [1 ]
Wang, Xianjia [2 ]
机构
[1] Wuhan Univ Technol, Sch Management, Wuhan 430070, Peoples R China
[2] Wuhan Univ, Sch Econ & Management, Wuhan 430072, Peoples R China
基金
中国国家自然科学基金;
关键词
Spatial public goods game; Evolution of cooperation; Synergy and discounting; Nonlinear payoff; EVOLUTIONARY DYNAMICS; REPLICATOR DYNAMICS; REPUTATION; POPULATION; PROMOTES; TRAGEDY;
D O I
10.1016/j.physleta.2020.127055
中图分类号
O4 [物理学];
学科分类号
0702 ;
摘要
Hauert et al. [1] first observed the effects of discounting and synergy in social dilemma games and systematically studied these effects on cooperation in an unstructured population. This paper extends the effects of discounting and synergy into spatial public goods games (PGG) with a population structure. Specifically, an economy-scale threshold and an amplitude parameter to describe conditions and degrees of discounting and synergy are introduced, respectively. Simulation results show that nonlinear payoff based on synergy and discounting effects can promote cooperation more significantly than linear payoff structure. Moreover, the smaller the threshold value, the easier to trigger the synergy effect and remove the discounting effect; the larger the amplitude parameter, the stronger the effect of synergy and discounting to play a role. In both situations, it is more favorable for the emergence and prosperity of cooperation. These results are helpful to understand the evolution of cooperation in nonlinear PGG. (C) 2020 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
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页数:6
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