Discrepancy between explicit judgement of agency and implicit feeling of agency: Implications for sense of agency and its disorders

被引:68
作者
Saito, Naho [1 ]
Takahata, Keisuke [2 ]
Murai, Toshiya [1 ]
Takahashi, Hidehiko [1 ]
机构
[1] Kyoto Univ, Dept Psychiat, Grad Sch Med, Sakyo Ku, Kyoto 6068507, Japan
[2] Natl Inst Radiol Sci, Mol Imaging Ctr, Inage Ku, Chiba 2638555, Japan
基金
日本学术振兴会;
关键词
Sense of agency; Voluntary action; Feeling of agency; Judgement of agency; Central monitoring; Intentional binding; INTENTIONAL ACTION; ALTERED AWARENESS; COMPARATOR MODEL; SCHIZOPHRENIA; SELF; BINDING; ABNORMALITIES; PREDICTION; EXPERIENCE; OWNERSHIP;
D O I
10.1016/j.concog.2015.07.011
中图分类号
B84 [心理学];
学科分类号
04 ; 0402 ;
摘要
The sense of agency refers to the feeling of authorship that "I am the one who is controlling external events through my own action". A distinction between explicit judgement of agency and implicit feeling of agency has been proposed theoretically. However, there has not been sufficient experimental evidence to support this distinction. We have assessed separate explicit and implicit agency measures in the same population and investigated their relationships. Intentional binding task was employed as an implicit measure and self-other attribution task as an explicit measure, which are known to reflect clinical symptoms of disorders in the sense of agency. The results of the implicit measure and explicit measure were not correlated, suggesting dissociation of the explicit judgement of agency and the implicit feeling of agency. (C) 2015 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:1 / 7
页数:7
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