Non-binding minimum taxes may foster tax competition

被引：11

作者：

Konrad, Kai A. ^{[1
,2
]}

机构：

[1] Free Univ Berlin, Dept Econ, D-1000 Berlin, Germany

[2] Social Sci Res Ctr Berlin WZB, Berlin, Germany

来源：

ECONOMICS LETTERS | 2009年 / 102卷 / 02期

关键词：

Tax competition; Minimum tax; Tax coordination; Stackelberg; COORDINATION; COUNTRIES;

D O I：

10.1016/j.econlet.2008.11.028

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

In a Stackelberg framework of capital income taxation it is shown that imposing a minimum tax rate that is lower than all countries' equilibrium tax rates in the unconstrained non-cooperative equilibrium may reduce equilibrium tax rates in all countries. (c) 2008 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：109 / 111

页数：3

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