Search intensity, wage dispersion and the minimum wage

被引：10

作者：

Gautier, Pieter A. ^{[1
,2
]}

Moraga-Gonzalez, Jose L. ^{[1
,2
,3
,4
]}

机构：

[1] Vrije Univ Amsterdam, Dept Econ, De Boelelaan 1105, NL-1081 HV Amsterdam, Netherlands

[2] Vrije Univ Amsterdam, Tinbergen Inst, De Boelelaan 1105, NL-1081 HV Amsterdam, Netherlands

[3] Univ Groningen, CESifo, CEPR, Groningen, Netherlands

[4] IESE, Res Ctr, Publ Private Sect, Barcelona, Spain

来源：

LABOUR ECONOMICS | 2018年 / 50卷

关键词：

Search Intensity; Wage dispersion; Minimum wage; MULTIPLE APPLICATIONS; UNEMPLOYMENT; MODEL; DIFFERENTIALS;

D O I：

10.1016/j.labeco.2017.04.003

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

We study a labor market where employers post wages and workers simultaneously choose the number of applications they send out. Firms offer the job to a worker at random; workers with multiple offers pick the best one. If the application costs are sufficiently low, workers contact multiple firms and there is wage dispersion in equilibrium. The number of applications workers send out is excessive from a welfare perspective due to a rent seeking externality. A mandatory minimum wage increases the mean and reduces the variance of the wage distribution. The net effect on welfare is ambiguous. (C) 2017 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：80 / 86

页数：7

共 32 条

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