'Peacekeeping' in East Timor: An Australian policy departure

被引:7
作者
Cotton, J [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ New S Wales, Australian Def Force Acad, Kensington, NSW 2033, Australia
来源
AUSTRALIAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS | 1999年 / 53卷 / 03期
关键词
D O I
10.1080/00049919993836
中图分类号
D81 [国际关系];
学科分类号
030207 ;
摘要
The place of Indonesia in Australia's bilateral and regional relations needs to be considered. In the second half of 1998, caution on supporting any innovation in policy on the Timor issue was urged by those who argued that pressuring Indonesia to accept a change in East Timor might stimulate separatism in other parts of the archipelago. Already, ethnic strife had seen hundreds killed in West Kalimantan, Aceh and Ambon. The break-up of Indonesia would raise a host of difficulties for Australia, ranging from the appearance of refugees to trade disruption. In addition, there was recognition that East Timor was a matter of acute sensitivity to the Indonesian military (as has already been argued). Whatever the view of the civilian government, the military were likely to remain an influential force, and offending them would not be likely to advance good relations. Furthermore, Indonesia is the crucial nation when it comes to the success or failure of Australia's attempts to 'engage' with its immediate region. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation and, latterly, the ASEAN Regional Forum are the institutional pillars of 'engagement', while Indonesia is the key to all these groups. The Australian intervention in the East Timor issue was not taken, therefore, before a careful examination of the many risks and costs involved. The fact that it was taken by a Conservative government aware that such action might prejudice regional relations for some time to come is surely noteworthy. Australia's past role was also, however, an important consideration in Australian policy. In 1974-75 (prior to the annexation) and again in 1983-85 (when there was a ceasefire and talks about reconciliation), Australia avoided giving the East Timorese issue the emphasis that might have then influenced Indonesian policy. In 1992, after the Dili massacre, Australia joined with Japan in blocking a resolution in the UN Human Rights Commission critical of Indonesia. This policy was changed in 1993, probably as a consequence of criticism of Indonesia in the US Congress, which led to a reversal of Washington's policy. These episodes are now the cause for some regret in Australia.
引用
收藏
页码:237 / 246
页数:10
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