ULTIMATUM GAME WITH ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION: A STUDY OF DECEPTION AND FAIRNESS

被引:9
作者
Vesely, Stepan [1 ]
机构
[1] Masaryk Univ, Fac Arts, Brno, Czech Republic
关键词
Ultimatum Game; deception; fairness; asymmetric information; gender differences; GENDER-DIFFERENCES; EXPECTATIONS; PREFERENCES; COMPETITION; BEHAVIOR; PEOPLE;
D O I
10.21909/sp.2014.01.650
中图分类号
B84 [心理学];
学科分类号
04 ; 0402 ;
摘要
The task of the experiment reported here is to examine decision making in ultimatum games with symmetric and asymmetric information. In the asymmetric information condition, subjects (n = 134) were given an opportunity to deceive their playing partner. I found that participants indeed deceived their partners, specifically: While subjects were given on average 108.06 (probabilistic) CZK (Czech Koruna) to divide among themselves and their partner, in the asymmetric condition they reported to their partner that they were given 59.05 CZK only. Subsequently, they allocated only 30.19 CZK to their partner in the asymmetric information ultimatum game, whereas in the symmetric information game, where deception was not possible, they allocated 48.65 CZK. The larger the surplus to be divided, the more deception was present. Women deceived significantly more than men and allocated less money to their partner in the asymmetric information ultimatum game (the effect size of gender was small, though).
引用
收藏
页码:53 / 66
页数:14
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