Board independence and firm performance: evidence from Kuwait

被引:11
作者
Al-Saidi, Mejbel [1 ]
机构
[1] PAAET, Dept Accounting, Safat, Kuwait
关键词
Board independence; Firm performance; Kuwait; Board; Performance; Corporate governance; Accounting and finance; CORPORATE PERFORMANCE; AGENCY PROBLEMS; OWNERSHIP; DIRECTORS; SIZE;
D O I
10.1108/IJLMA-06-2019-0145
中图分类号
D9 [法律]; DF [法律];
学科分类号
0301 ;
摘要
Purpose This paper aims to reduce the knowledge gap by using a large sample and different regressions while controlling the endogeneity and causality issues. Design/methodology/approach This study used the ordinary least square (OLS) and two stage least squares (2SLS) regressions to control the endogeneity and causality problems; this estimation strategy allows for comparison of both estimates to identify any inconsistency and biases in the parameters. Findings General speaking, this study found that board independence negatively affected firm performance based on Tobin's Q only and the relationship between the two variables ran from board independence to firm performance but not vice versa. Originality/value The current independent directors are not adding value to Kuwait's listed firms. Some directors who represent large shareholders and the conflict between large shareholders and small shareholders could affect the role of independent directors in Kuwait. To best of the researchers' knowledge, this study is the first to consider board independent after controlling the issues of endogeneity and causality in Kuwait; thus, the results could be useful for Kuwaiti firms, regulators and policymakers.
引用
收藏
页码:251 / 262
页数:12
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