Rationality and bounded rationality

被引：125
作者：
Aumann, RJ
机构：
来源：
GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR | 1997年 / 21卷 / 1-2期
基金：
美国国家科学基金会;
关键词：
D O I：
10.1006/game.1997.0585
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
[No abstract available]
引用
收藏
页码：2 / 14
页数：13
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