Naturalness: Beyond animal welfare

There is an ongoing debate in animal ethics on the meaning and scope of animal welfare. In certain broader views, leading a natural life through the development of natural capabilities is also headed under the concept of animal welfare. I argue that a concern for the development of natural capabilities of an animal such as expressed when living freely should be distinguished from the preservation of the naturalness of its behavior and appearance. However, it is not always clear where a plea for natural living changes over into a plea for the preservation of their naturalness or wildness. In the first part of this article, I examine to what extent the concerns for natural living meet "the experience requirement." I conclude that some of these concerns go beyond welfare. In the second part of the article. I ask whether we have moral reasons to respect concerns for the naturalness of an animal's living that transcend its welfare. I argue that the moral relevance of such considerations can be grasped when we see animals as entities bearing non-moral intrinsic values. In my view the "natural" appearance and behavior of an animal may embody intrinsic values. Caring for an animal's naturalness should then be understood as caring for such intrinsic values. Intrinsic values provide moral reasons for action iff they are seen as constitutive of the good life for humans. I conclude by reinterpreting, within the framework of a perfectionist ethical theory, the notion of indirect duties regarding animals, which go beyond and supplement the direct duties towards animals.