Resource Allocation and Coalition formation for UAVs: A Cooperative Game Approach

In this paper cooperative game theory is used to obtain a solution to a resource allocation problem for a team of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) prosecuting a target. To overpower the target a variety of resource types are required. The constraints on usage of a resource type vary from one UAV to another. The cost functions of the UAVs, associated with spending the resources, are different. Considering the UAVs to be rational and intelligent, the problem of coalition formation and coalition stability have been addressed here. The problem is formulated as a cooperative game of cost savings. When the individual cost functions have certain characteristics then all the members of a coalition agree to allocate optimal amounts of resources resulting into a Pareto optimal savings value for the coalition. Existence of a nonempty core, which is associated with stability of the coalitions, has been also proved for this game. A particular distribution of this generated value among the members of the coalition, in a virtual sense, has been shown to satisfy the properties of core solution of the game.