Subjective uncertainty over behavior strategies: A correction

被引：13

作者：

Dekel, E

Fudenberg, D ^{[1
]}

Levine, DK

机构：

[1] Northwestern Univ, Dept Econ, Evanston, IL 60201 USA

[2] Tel Aviv Univ, Dept Econ, IL-69978 Tel Aviv, Israel

[3] Harvard Univ, Dept Econ, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA

[4] Univ Calif Los Angeles, Dept Econ, Los Angeles, CA 90024 USA

来源：

JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY | 2002年 / 104卷 / 02期

基金：

美国国家科学基金会;

关键词：

extensive-form games; behavior strategies; subjective uncertainty; rationalizability; self-confirming equilibrium;

D O I：

10.1006/jeth.2001.2866

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

In order to model the subjective uncertainty of a player over the behavior strategies of an opponent, one must consider the player's beliefs about the opponent's play at information sets that the player thinks have probability zero. This corregendum uses "trembles" to provide a definition of the convex bull of a set of behavior strategies. This corrects a definition we gave in [E. Dekel, D. Fudenberg, and D. K. Levine, 1999, J. Econ. Theory 89, 165-185], which led to two of the solution concepts we defined there not having the properties we intended. (C) 2002 Elsevier Science (USA).

引用

页码：473 / 478

页数：6

共 9 条

[1]

ASHEIM G, 2000, UNPUB LEXICOGRAPHIC

[2]

BATTIGALLI P, 1976, J ECON THEORY, V70, P201

[3] RATIONALIZABLE STRATEGIC BEHAVIOR [J].