Predictive value and the usefulness of game theoretic models

被引:21
作者
Erev, I [1 ]
Roth, AE
Slonim, RL
Barron, G
机构
[1] Columbia Univ, Grad Sch Business, New York, NY 10027 USA
[2] Harvard Univ, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA
[3] Case Western Reserve Univ, Cleveland, OH 44106 USA
[4] Technion Israel Inst Technol, Haifa, Israel
基金
美国国家科学基金会;
关键词
predictive value; role playing;
D O I
10.1016/S0169-2070(02)00023-7
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
Green [Int. J. Forecasting (2002)] reports that in certain settings predictions made by game theorists can be outperformed by the outcome of a short role playing exercise. Goodwin [Int. J. Forecasting (2002)] argues that this does not imply that game theoretic analysis cannot be useful. The current paper discusses two types of observations that support this assertion. First, there are many important settings in which game theoretic models have high forecasting power. Two examples: the aggregate outcome of entry job markets, and the outcome of repeated interactions are summarized here. The second observation concerns the possibility of objectively forecasting the predictive value of specific models (and methods) on particular domains. To increase our understanding of the value of role playing, we suggest that future research focus on estimating the predictive value of this method using a random selection of problems from a well defined set. (C) 2002 International Institute of Forecasters. Published by Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:359 / 368
页数:10
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