RETRACTED: Analysts' reactions to earnings preannouncement strategies (Retracted article. See vol. 53, pg. 907, 2015)

被引:59
作者
Tan, HT [1 ]
Libby, R
Hunton, JE
机构
[1] Nanyang Technol Univ, Singapore, Singapore
[2] Cornell Univ, Ithaca, NY 14853 USA
[3] Univ S Florida, Tampa, FL 33620 USA
关键词
D O I
10.1111/1475-679X.00045
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
Preannouncements of earnings tend to overstate negative or understate positive news, which decreases the chance of a negative surprise when actual earnings is announced. We conduct an experiment to investigate how experienced sell-side analysts' earnings forecasts are affected by preannouncements that either understate, accurately state, or overstate the magnitude of positive or negative total earnings news, holding total earnings news constant. We find that firms with negative (positive) total news receive the highest post-earnings announcement forecasts of future earnings when the earlier preannouncement overstates (understates) the magnitude of the news. These forecasts are consistent with the analysts' perceptions about the firms' future prospects, but not their perceptions of management. While analysts expect preannouncements to be lower than actual earnings, they do not adjust their forecasts for these beliefs. These insights into analysts' responses have implications both for managers and analysts.
引用
收藏
页码:223 / 246
页数:24
相关论文
共 24 条
[11]   ORDER EFFECTS IN BELIEF UPDATING - THE BELIEF-ADJUSTMENT MODEL [J].
HOGARTH, RM ;
EINHORN, HJ .
COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY, 1992, 24 (01) :1-55
[12]  
IP G, 1997, WALL STREET J 0623
[13]   On the reality of cognitive illusions [J].
Kahneman, D ;
Tversky, A .
PSYCHOLOGICAL REVIEW, 1996, 103 (03) :582-591
[14]  
KASZNIK R, 1995, ACCOUNT REV, V70, P113
[15]  
KASZNIK R, 1999, DOES M EXPECTATIONS
[16]  
KILE C, 1998, FREQUENTLY DO MANAGE
[17]  
KRISCHE SD, 2000, INFORMATION CONTENT
[18]   Does mandated audit communication reduce opportunistic corrections to manage earnings to forecasts? [J].
Libby, R ;
Kinney, WR .
ACCOUNTING REVIEW, 2000, 75 (04) :383-404
[19]   Analysts' reactions to warnings of negative earnings surprises [J].
Libby, R ;
Tan, HT .
JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING RESEARCH, 1999, 37 (02) :415-435
[20]   Implications of proposed segment reporting standards for financial analysts' investment judgments [J].
Maines, LA ;
McDaniel, LS ;
Harris, MS .
JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING RESEARCH, 1997, 35 :1-24