Hardware Security: Physical Design versus Side-channel and Fault Attacks

被引:0
|
作者
Verbauwhede, Ingrid [1 ]
机构
[1] Katholieke Univ Leuven, COSIC, Leuven, Belgium
来源
ISPD'22: PROCEEDINGS OF THE 2022 INTERNATIONAL SYMPOSIUM ON PHYSICAL DESIGN | 2022年
关键词
Hardware security; cryptography; side-channel attacks; fault attacks; physical design;
D O I
10.1145/3505170.3513089
中图分类号
TP3 [计算技术、计算机技术];
学科分类号
0812 ;
摘要
What is "hardware" security? How can we improve trustworthiness in hardware circuits? Is there a design method for secure hardware design? To answer these questions, different communities have different expectations of trusted (expecting trustworthy) hardware components upon which they start to build a secure system. At the same time, electronics shrink: sensor nodes, IOT devices, smart electronics are becoming more and more available. In the past, adding security was only a concern for locked server rooms or now cloud servers. However, these days, our portable devices contain highly private and secure information. Adding security and cryptography to these often very resource constraint devices is a challenge. Moreover, they can be subject to physical attacks, including sidechannel and fault attacks [1][2]. This presentation aims at bringing some order in the chaos of expectations by introducing the importance of a design methodology for secure design [3][5]. We will illustrate the capabilities of current side EM and laser fault passive and active attacks. In this context, we will also reflect on the role of physical design, place and route [4][6].
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页码:219 / 219
页数:1
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