Do managers withhold bad news from credit rating agencies?

被引:17
作者
Ahn, Minkwan [1 ]
Bonsall, Samuel B. [2 ]
Van Buskirk, Andrew [3 ]
机构
[1] Univ Hong Kong, Sch Business, Pokfulam, KK Leung Bldg, Hong Kong, Peoples R China
[2] Penn State Univ, Smeal Coll Business, 354 Business Bldg, University Pk, PA 16802 USA
[3] Ohio State Univ, Fisher Coll Business, 2100 Neil Ave, Columbus, OH 43210 USA
关键词
Credit rating agencies; Asymmetric disclosure; Private information; DEFAULT SWAP; ACCOUNTING CONSERVATISM; EARNINGS MANAGEMENT; INTERACTION TERMS; IMPACT; INFORMATION; DISCLOSURE; MARKETS; MATTER; TONE;
D O I
10.1007/s11142-019-09496-x
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
Research documents that managers, on average, withhold bad news and emphasize good news in their public disclosures. We ask whether the same is true in their private communications with credit rating agencies. We study how rating agencies anticipate and react to public information events as a function of their access to rated firms' private information. We show that, in terms of ratings downgrades, rating agencies exhibit relatively more anticipation and less reaction to negative (compared to positive) public information events when they have more access to private information. Our results are strongest when firms are most optimistic in their public disclosures and are not due to rating agencies focusing their efforts on downside risk. Overall, we find consistent evidence that rated firms provide less optimistic information to rating agencies in their private communications and that this information is reflected in credit ratings.
引用
收藏
页码:972 / 1021
页数:50
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