Asymptotic revenue equivalence in auctions

被引：13

作者：

Bali, V

Jackson, M

机构：

[1] Michigan State Univ, Dept Polit Sci, E Lansing, MI 48824 USA

[2] CALTECH, Pasadena, CA 91125 USA

来源：

JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY | 2002年 / 106卷 / 01期

关键词：

auctions; revenue equivalence; mechanisms;

D O I：

10.1006/jeth.2001.2870

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

We study the revenue in auctions of a single object when the number of bidders becomes large. We show that all sequences of auctions belonging to a class of mechanisms have limiting expected revenue equal to the expected best-use value of the object. An important special case that is covered is common value auctions, but more generally not even affiliation of values is assumed. This provides an asymptotic revenue equivalence result for settings beyond that of private values. (C) 2002 Elsevier Science (USA).

引用

页码：161 / 176

页数：16

共 14 条

[1] FULL EXTRACTION OF THE SURPLUS IN BAYESIAN AND DOMINANT STRATEGY AUCTIONS [J].