North Korean Nuclear politics at the crossroads

被引:2
作者
Kim, T
机构
[1] Secty. and Strategy Research Center, Korea Institute for Defense Analyses
关键词
D O I
10.1080/10163270409464064
中图分类号
D81 [国际关系];
学科分类号
030207 ;
摘要
North Korea, through its nuclear endgame involving agile intermingling of brinkmanship and appeasement, has successfully chased three rabbits simultaneously: extracting quid pro quos through negotiation; achieving "nuclear deterrence capability" by transgressing agreements; and subjugating South Korea ideologically and strategically. While harvesting economic returns and prestige through negotiations, the nation has muddled through to the point that it can show the "plutonium bombs-in-the-basement" any time and produce highly enriched uranium soon. The North's call for "inter-Korean brotherly collaboration" delicately combined with nuclear blackmail has divided South Korean society and estranged the ROK-U.S. alliance. However, the game as entered a sudden-death playoff as the North's internal paradoxes as well as the international pressure will not tolerate it any longer. Soon Pyongyang will have to make a strategic choice among Pakistani, Israeli, Libyan, and Ukrainian models. While Pyongyang may regard the first two choices as too risky and the third one as too insulting, the Ukrainian experience under the Nunn-Lugar Program is a safe, prudent way for North Korea to get out of the dangerous nuclear acrobatics. Becoming a government for its own people, not vice-versa, would be a good starting point.
引用
收藏
页码:27 / 47
页数:21
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