Simulation and the first-person

被引:4
作者
Carruthers, Peter [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Maryland, Dept Philosophy, College Pk, MD 20742 USA
关键词
EXPERIENCE; CONSCIOUSNESS; ATTRIBUTION; INTENTION; PRETEND; ACCESS; STATES;
D O I
10.1007/s11098-009-9357-y
中图分类号
B [哲学、宗教];
学科分类号
01 ; 0101 ;
摘要
This article focuses on, and critiques, Goldman's view that third-person mind-reading is grounded in first-person introspection. It argues, on the contrary, that first-person awareness of propositional attitude events is always interpretative, resulting from us turning our mind-reading abilities upon ourselves.
引用
收藏
页码:467 / 475
页数:9
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