Strategic price subsidies for new technologies

被引:18
作者
Janssens, Gert [1 ]
Zaccour, Georges [1 ]
机构
[1] Ecole Hautes Etud Commerciales, Gerad, HEC Montreal, Montreal, PQ H3T 2A7, Canada
基金
加拿大自然科学与工程研究理事会;
关键词
Price subsidies; New technologies; Differential games; Stackelberg equilibrium;
D O I
10.1016/j.automatica.2014.05.017
中图分类号
TP [自动化技术、计算机技术];
学科分类号
0812 ;
摘要
In the literature, the study of price subsidies of new technologies has focused on the tactical problem of achieving maximum penetration under a budget constraint over a short horizon. In practice, such tactical, short-term penetration objectives seem both to adequately reflect the structure of many price subsidy programs (e.g., solar energy), and account for their high failure rate. The present paper goes beyond determining optimal price and subsidy paths under a budget constraint and focuses on strategic decision making. A generic strategic objective of price subsidies is to make a product or technology competitive at an earlier point in the future than would otherwise be possible. This begs the natural question of feasibility. While determining feasibility, we derive detailed price and subsidy paths and the government budget required. Then, we can iteratively determine the program that maximizes welfare. (C) 2014 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:1999 / 2006
页数:8
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