Conveniently Upset: Avoiding Altruism by Distorting Beliefs about Others' Altruism

被引：80

作者：

Di Tella, Rafael ^{[1
]}

Perez-Truglia, Ricardo ^{[2
]}

Babino, Andres ^{[3
]}

Sigman, Mariano ^{[4
,5
,6
]}

机构：

[1] Harvard Univ, Sch Business, Boston, MA 02163 USA

[2] Microsoft Res, New England Res & Dev NERD Lab, Cambridge, MA 02142 USA

[3] UBA, Dept Fis, RA-1426 Buenos Aires, DF, Argentina

[4] UBA, Dept Fis, FCEN, RA-1426 Buenos Aires, DF, Argentina

[5] IFIBA, Buenos Aires, DF, Argentina

[6] Univ Torcuato Di Tella, Buenos Aires, DF, Argentina

来源：

AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW | 2015年 / 105卷 / 11期

关键词：

COGNITIVE-DISSONANCE; DICTATOR GAMES; REDISTRIBUTIVE POLITICS; ELASTIC JUSTIFICATION; SOCIAL PREFERENCES; REGARDING BEHAVIOR; PROPERTY-RIGHTS; SELF-INTEREST; FAIRNESS; RECIPROCITY;

D O I：

10.1257/aer.20141409

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

We present results from a "corruption game" (a dictator game modified so that recipients can take a side payment in exchange for accepting a reduction in the overall size of the pie). Dictators (silently) treated to be able to take more of the recipient's tokens, took more of them. They were also more likely to believe that recipients had accepted side payments, even if there was a prize for accuracy. The results favor the hypothesis that people avoid altruistic actions by distorting beliefs about others' altruism.

引用

页码：3416 / 3442

页数：27

共 82 条

[1] An experimental bribery game [J].