High endemic levels of typhoid fever in rural areas of Ghana may stem from optimal voluntary vaccination behaviour

被引:18
作者
Acosta-Alonzo, Carmen B. [1 ]
Erovenko, Igor V. [2 ]
Lancaster, Aaleah [1 ]
Oh, Hyunju [3 ]
Rychtar, Jan [4 ]
Taylor, Dewey [4 ]
机构
[1] Bennett Coll, Dept Math & Comp Sci, Greensboro, NC 27401 USA
[2] Univ N Carolina, Dept Math & Stat, Greensboro, NC 27402 USA
[3] Univ Guam, Div Math & Comp Sci, Mangilao, GU 96923 USA
[4] Virginia Commonwealth Univ, Dept Math & Appl Math, Med Coll Virginia Campus, Richmond, VA 23284 USA
来源
PROCEEDINGS OF THE ROYAL SOCIETY A-MATHEMATICAL PHYSICAL AND ENGINEERING SCIENCES | 2020年 / 476卷 / 2241期
关键词
epidemiology; game theory; herd immunity; human behaviour; typhoid fever; vaccination; EPIDEMIOLOGIC MODEL; SALMONELLA-TYPHI; ANTITYPHOID IMMUNIZATION; DECISION-MAKING; DYNAMICS; TRANSMISSION; DISEASE; AFRICA; SURVEILLANCE; MALARIA;
D O I
10.1098/rspa.2020.0354
中图分类号
O [数理科学和化学]; P [天文学、地球科学]; Q [生物科学]; N [自然科学总论];
学科分类号
07 ; 0710 ; 09 ;
摘要
Typhoid fever has long established itself endemically in rural Ghana despite the availability of cheap and effective vaccines. We used a game-theoretic model to investigate whether the low vaccination coverage in Ghana could be attributed to rational human behaviour. We adopted a version of an epidemiological model of typhoid fever dynamics, which accounted not only for chronic life-long carriers but also for a short-cycle transmission in the immediate environment and a long-cycle transmission via contamination of the water supply. We calibrated the model parameters based on the known incidence data. We found that unless the (perceived) cost of vaccination is negligible, the individually optimal population vaccination rate falls significantly short of the societally optimal population vaccination rate needed to reach herd immunity. We expressed both the herd immunity and the optimal equilibrium vaccination rates in terms of only a few observable parameters such as the incidence rate, demographics, vaccine waning rate and the perceived cost of vaccination relative to the cost of infection. This allowed us not to rely on other uncertain epidemiological model parameters and, in particular, to bypass uncertainties about the role of the carriers in the transmission.
引用
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页数:15
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