Professional and Commercial Incentives in Audit Firms: Evidence on Partner Compensation

被引:17
作者
Vandenhaute, Marie-Laure [1 ,2 ]
Hardies, Kris [3 ]
Breesch, Diane [1 ,2 ]
机构
[1] Vrije Univ Brussel, Fac Social Sci, Pl Laan 2, B-1050 Brussels, Belgium
[2] Vrije Univ Brussel, Solvay Business Sch, Pl Laan 2, B-1050 Brussels, Belgium
[3] Univ Antwerp, Dept Accounting & Finance, Antwerp, Belgium
关键词
Partner Compensation; Financial Incentives; Equal Sharing; Performance Based; ACCOUNTING FIRMS; AGENCY-THEORY; MORAL HAZARD; PERFORMANCE; CLIENT; ORGANIZATION; MANAGEMENT; EXPLORATION; IDENTITIES; OWNERSHIP;
D O I
10.1080/09638180.2019.1642223
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
Audit firms can shape and foster the desired behavior of their partners in accordance with the firm's strategy and objectives through compensation schemes. Understanding financial incentives is therefore of great importance, especially to ensure that auditors actually deliver high quality work. This study analyzes the elements associated with the compensation of audit partners in Belgium, and specifically contributes to the literature by investigating how compensation schemes vary across firms of different sizes (Big 4, second-tier, and small audit firms). Our results indicate that the mixture of equal sharing and performance based compensation elements varies across firms of different sizes. Partner compensation in larger (Big 4 and second-tier) firms is more heavily based on performance based elements than in smaller audit firms. Furthermore, in firms of all sizes compensation appears to be strongly associated with commercially oriented elements while professionally oriented elements only play a minor role. Professionally oriented elements are, however, slightly more important in larger (Big 4 and second-tier) firms than in smaller firms.
引用
收藏
页码:521 / 554
页数:34
相关论文
共 92 条
  • [1] ALCHIAN AA, 1972, AM ECON REV, V62, P777
  • [2] In the name of the client: The service ethic in two professional services firms
    Anderson-Gough, F
    Grey, C
    Robson, K
    [J]. HUMAN RELATIONS, 2000, 53 (09) : 1151 - 1174
  • [3] [Anonymous], TACKL GEND PAY GAP E
  • [4] [Anonymous], 2010, Green paper. Audit policy: Lessons from the crisis
  • [5] [Anonymous], CONS REP TRANSP FIRM
  • [6] COMPENSATION AND INCENTIVES - PRACTICE VS THEORY
    BAKER, GP
    JENSEN, MC
    MURPHY, KJ
    [J]. JOURNAL OF FINANCE, 1988, 43 (03) : 593 - 616
  • [7] A THEORY OF AUDIT PARTNERSHIPS - AUDIT FIRM SIZE AND FEES
    BALACHANDRAN, BV
    RAMAKRISHNAN, RTS
    [J]. JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING RESEARCH, 1987, 25 (01) : 111 - 126
  • [8] Risk monitoring and control in audit firms: A research synthesis
    Bedard, Jean C.
    Deis, Donald R.
    Curtis, Mary B.
    Jenkins, J. Gregory
    [J]. AUDITING-A JOURNAL OF PRACTICE & THEORY, 2008, 27 (01): : 187 - 218
  • [9] Do the Big 4 and the Second-tier firms provide audits of similar quality?
    Boone, Jeff P.
    Khurana, Inder K.
    Raman, K. K.
    [J]. JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING AND PUBLIC POLICY, 2010, 29 (04) : 330 - 352
  • [10] The changing professional organization: A review of competing archetypes
    Brock, David M.
    [J]. INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF MANAGEMENT REVIEWS, 2006, 8 (03) : 157 - 174