Explanatoriness is evidentially irrelevant, or inference to the best explanation meets Bayesian confirmation theory

被引：34

作者：

Roche, William ^{[2
]}

Sober, Elliott ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Wisconsin, Madison, WI 53706 USA

[2] Texas Christian Univ, Ft Worth, TX 76129 USA

来源：

ANALYSIS | 2013年 / 73卷 / 04期

关键词：

Bayesian confirmation theory; evidence; explanation; Hempel; inference to the best explanation; probability; Salmon; screening-off; Van Fraassen;

D O I：

10.1093/analys/ant079

中图分类号：

B [哲学、宗教];

学科分类号：

01 ; 0101 ;

摘要：

In the world of philosophy of science, the dominant theory of confirmation is Bayesian. In the wider philosophical world, the idea of inference to the best explanation exerts a considerable influence. Here we place the two worlds in collision, using Bayesian confirmation theory to argue that explanatoriness is evidentially irrelevant. © 2013 The Authors 2013. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Analysis Trust. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：659 / 668

页数：11

共 22 条

[1]

[Anonymous], 1989, LAWS SYMMETRY, DOI DOI 10.1093/0198248601.001.0001

[2]

Bromberger Sylvain, 1966, Mind and Cosmos: Essays in Contemporary Science and Philosophy, P86

[3] PUTTING INFERENCE TO THE BEST EXPLANATION IN ITS PLACE [J].