Simple strategy-proof approximately Walrasian mechanisms

被引：7
作者：
Kovalenkov, A [1 ]
机构：
[1] Univ N Carolina, Dept Econ, Chapel Hill, NC 27599 USA
来源：
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY | 2002年 / 103卷 / 02期
关键词：
Walrasian mechanism; large economics; implementation; strategy-proofness; limit theorem;
D O I：
10.1006/jeth.2000.2788
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
This note provides an indirect analysis of the incentive properties of the Walrasian mechanism. It presents mechanisms under which truth-telling is a dominant strategy in Finite exchange economics (in contrast to the Walrasian mechanism) and whose outcomes (generically) approximate Walrasian ones for large economics. These mechanisms provide new insights on the well-know trade-off between efficiency and incentive compatibility in finite economics. (C) 2001 Elsevier Science (USA).
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页码：475 / 487
页数：13
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