The calculus of piratical consent: the myth of the myth of social contract

被引:54
作者
Leeson, Peter T. [1 ]
机构
[1] George Mason Univ, Fairfax, VA 22030 USA
关键词
Pirates; Social contract; Calculus of consent; Constitutional democracy; ECONOMICS; LAW;
D O I
10.1007/s11127-009-9403-5
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
Is a genuine social contract mythical? I argue that pirates created genuine social contracts that established a system of constitutional democracy based on the same decision-making calculus and with the same effects that Buchanan and Tullock's contractarian theory of government describes in The Calculus of Consent. Pirates' constitutional democracy is the "holy grail" of social contract theory. It demonstrates that the contractarian basis of constitutional democracy is more than a mere analytic device or hypothetical explanation of how such a government could emerge. In pirates' case, Buchanan and Tullock's social contract theory describes how constitutional democracy actually did emerge.
引用
收藏
页码:443 / 459
页数:17
相关论文
共 48 条
  • [1] [Anonymous], 1870, No Treason: The Constitution of No Authority
  • [2] BAER JH, 1699, BRIT PIRACY GOLDEN A, V3
  • [3] BAER JH, 1719, BRIT PIRACY GOLDEN A, V2
  • [4] BAER JH, 1704, BRIT PIRACY GOLDEN A, V2
  • [5] BAER JH, 1721, BRIT PIRACY GOLDEN A, V3
  • [6] Baer Joel., 2007, British Piracy in the Golden Age : History and Interpretation, 1660-1730
  • [7] Baer Joel H., 1718, British Piracy in the Golden Age, V2
  • [8] Baer Joel H., 1723, British Piracy in the Golden Age, V3
  • [9] THE ALLOCATION OF RESOURCES BY VOTING
    BARZEL, Y
    SASS, TR
    [J]. QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 1990, 105 (03) : 745 - 771
  • [10] THE SPONTANEOUS EVOLUTION OF COMMERCIAL-LAW
    BENSON, BL
    [J]. SOUTHERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL, 1989, 55 (03) : 644 - 661