CEO Turnover, Financial Distress, and Contractual Innovations

被引：21

作者：

Evans, John Harry, III ^{[1
]}

Luo, Shuqing ^{[2
]}

Nagarajan, Nandu J. ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, PA 15260 USA

[2] Natl Univ Singapore, Singapore 117548, Singapore

来源：

ACCOUNTING REVIEW | 2014年 / 89卷 / 03期

关键词：

bankruptcy; Chapter; 11; CEO turnover; incentive contracts; corporate governance; Debtor in Possession (DIP) financing; Key Employee Retention Plans (KERPs); CORPORATE GOVERNANCE; MANAGEMENT TURNOVER; FIRM PERFORMANCE; BANKRUPTCY; COMPENSATION; INFORMATION; MARKET; LOGIT; COSTS;

D O I：

10.2308/accr-50688

中图分类号：

F8 [财政、金融];

学科分类号：

0202 ;

摘要：

The design of CEO incentives is particularly important for firms in financial distress. We compare the resolution of CEO incentive problems in distressed firms between the 1980s versus the 1990s, focusing on how changes in contractual provisions, as well as in the executive labor market, resulted in a shift to a new equilibrium. Our analyses provide evidence that the increased bargaining power of creditors, together with changes in the use of contractual provisions in the 1990s, enabled creditors to more effectively retain highly skilled CEOs with firm-specific knowledge and provide them with incentives to improve firm performance.

引用

页码：959 / 990

页数：32

共 43 条

[1] Interaction terms in logit and probit models [J].