What's Wrong with Speciesism? (Society of Applied Philosophy Annual Lecture 2015)

被引:66
作者
Kagan, Shelly [1 ]
机构
[1] Yale Univ, Dept Philosophy, POB 208306, New Haven, CT 06520 USA
关键词
D O I
10.1111/japp.12164
中图分类号
B82 [伦理学(道德学)];
学科分类号
摘要
Peter Singer famously argued in Animal Liberation that almost all of us are speciesists, unjustifiably favoring the interests of humans over the similar interests of other animals. Although I long found that charge compelling, I now find myself having doubts. This article starts by trying to get clear about the nature of speciesism, and then argues that Singer's attempt to show that speciesism is a mere prejudice is unsuccessful. I also argue that most of us are not actually speciesists at all, but rather accept a view I call modal personism. Although I am not confident that modal personism can be adequately defended, it is, at the very least, a philosophical view worthy of further consideration.
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页码:1 / 21
页数:21
相关论文
共 2 条
[1]  
[Anonymous], 2009, ANIMAL LIBERATION
[2]  
[Anonymous], 2011, PRACTICAL ETHICS, VThird