Auditor Size and Going Concern Reporting

被引:51
作者
Berglund, Nathan R. [1 ]
Eshleman, John Daniel [2 ]
Guo, Peng [2 ]
机构
[1] Mississippi State Univ, Starkville, MS 39759 USA
[2] Michigan Technol Univ, Houghton, MI 49931 USA
来源
AUDITING-A JOURNAL OF PRACTICE & THEORY | 2018年 / 37卷 / 02期
关键词
audit quality; Big; 4; going concern; auditor conservatism; GOING-CONCERN OPINIONS; FINANCIAL DISTRESS; BIG; 4; INDEPENDENCE EVIDENCE; BANKRUPT COMPANIES; LIABILITY REGIMES; FEE DEPENDENCE; NONAUDIT FEES; QUALITY; DECISIONS;
D O I
10.2308/ajpt-51786
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
Auditing theory predicts that larger auditors will be more likely to issue a going concern opinion to a distressed client. However, the existing empirical evidence on this issue is mixed. We attribute these mixed results to a failure to adequately control for clients' financial health. We demonstrate how properly controlling for clients' financial health reveals a positive relationship between auditor size and the propensity to issue a going concern opinion. We corroborate our findings by replicating a related study and showing how the results change when financial health variables are added to the model. In supplemental analysis, we find that Big 4 auditors are more likely than mid-tier auditors (Grant Thornton and BDO Seidman) to issue going concern opinions to distressed clients. We also find that, compared to other auditors, the Big 4 are less likely to issue false-positive (Type I error) going concern opinions. We find no evidence that the Big 4 are more or less likely to fail to issue a going concern opinion to a client that eventually files for bankruptcy (Type II error). Our results are robust to the use of a variety of matching techniques.
引用
收藏
页码:1 / 25
页数:25
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