An extension of the Nash bargaining solution to nonconvex problems

被引：63

作者：

Conley, JP ^{[1
]}

Wilkie, S ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] CALTECH,DIV HUMANITIES & SOCIAL SCI,PASADENA,CA 91125

来源：

GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR | 1996年 / 13卷 / 01期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1006/game.1996.0023

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

We investigate the domain of comprehensive but not necessarily convex bargaining problems. Without convexity the Nash solution is not well defined. We propose a new solution, the Nash extension, that coincides with the Nash solution when S is convex. We characterize it by weak Pareto optimality, symmetry, scale invariance, continuity, and a new axiom, ethical monotonicity. (C) 1996 Academic Press, Inc.

引用

页码：26 / 38

页数：13

共 20 条

[1] BARGAINING WITHOUT CONVEXITY - GENERALIZING THE KALAI-SMORODINSKY SOLUTION [J].