SEC enforcement in the PIPE market: Actions and consequences

被引:9
作者
Bengtsson, Ola [1 ]
Dai, Na [2 ]
Henson, Clifford [3 ]
机构
[1] Lund Univ, Sch Econ & Management, Res Inst Ind Econ, Knut Wicksell Ctr Financial Studies, S-22100 Lund, Sweden
[2] SUNY Albany, Ctr Inst Investment Management, Albany, NY 12222 USA
[3] Skiermont Puckett LLP, Dallas, TX USA
关键词
Private Investment in Public Equity (PIPE); Regulation; The SEC; HEDGE FUNDS; INVESTMENTS; EQUITY; FIRMS;
D O I
10.1016/j.jbankfin.2014.02.002
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
In 2002, the SEC launched enforcement actions against investors involved in PIPE (Private Investments in Public Equity) transactions. We describe the legal ramifications of this enforcement initiative, and document dramatic contemporaneous market-wide changes in the contractual structure of PIPEs. PIPEs in the post-action period included fewer aggressive repricing rights and more trading restrictions. However, PIPEs in the post-action period also included more investor protections and fewer issuer rights. These results suggest that the SEC's enforcement enticed investors to substitute non-SEC-targeted contractual features for targeted ones. Our paper sheds new light on the role of legal enforcement on financial contract design. Published by Elsevier B.V.
引用
收藏
页码:213 / 231
页数:19
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