Disjunctivism, contextualism and the sceptical aporia

被引：0
作者：
Gundersen, Lars Bo [1 ]
机构：
[1] Univ Aarhus, IFI, DK-8000 Aarhus, Denmark
来源：
SYNTHESE | 2009年 / 171卷 / 03期
关键词：
Epistemology; Scepticism; Closure; Transmission; Disjunctivism; Contextualism; Knowledge; Evidence; KNOWLEDGE;
D O I：
10.1007/s11229-008-9320-z
中图分类号：
N09 [自然科学史]; B [哲学、宗教];
学科分类号：
01 ; 0101 ; 010108 ; 060207 ; 060305 ; 0712 ;
摘要：
We know things that entail things we apparently cannot come to know. This is a problem for those of us who trust that knowledge is closed under entailment. In the paper I discuss the solutions to this problem offered by epistemic disjunctivism and contextualism. The contention is that neither of these theories has the resources to deal satisfactory with the problem.
引用
收藏
页码：387 / 397
页数：11
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