Reference points in revenue sharing contracts How to design optimal supply chain contracts

被引:64
作者
Becker-Peth, Michael [1 ]
Thonemann, Ulrich W. [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Cologne, Dept Supply Chain Management & Management Sci, D-50923 Cologne, Germany
关键词
Supply chain management; Contracting; Behavioral operations research; Experiments; Reference-dependent valuation; BOUNDEDLY RATIONAL CUSTOMERS; NEWSVENDOR PROBLEM; REFERENCE DEPENDENCE; DECISION-MAKING; LOSS AVERSION; BRAND CHOICE; COORDINATION; MODEL; PREFERENCES; PERFORMANCE;
D O I
10.1016/j.ejor.2015.06.007
中图分类号
C93 [管理学];
学科分类号
12 ; 1201 ; 1202 ; 120202 ;
摘要
Coordinating supply chains is an important goal for contract designers because it enables the channel members to increase their profits. Recently, many experimental studies have shown that behavioral aspects have to be taken into account when choosing the type of contract and specifying the contract parameters. In this paper, we analyze behavioral aspects of revenue-sharing contracts. We extend the classical normative decision model by incorporating reference-dependent valuation into the decision model and show how this affects inventory decisions. We conduct different lab experiments to test our model. As a result, human inventory decisions deviate from classical normative predictions, and we find evidence for reference-dependent valuation of human decision makers. We also show how contract designers can use the insights we gained to design better contracts. (C) 2015 Elsevier B.V. and Association of European Operational Research Societies (EURO) within the International Federation of Operational Research Societies (IFORS). All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:1033 / 1049
页数:17
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